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ABSTRACT
Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g. the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to
be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium.
However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such
shrouding creates an inefficiency, which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their
competitors' customers. However, if add-ons have close substitutes, a "curse of debiasing" arises,
and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium,
two kinds of exploitation coexist. Optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing
schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons. In turn, sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing
schemes. It is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates. It is also not
possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to non-exploitative firms. We show that
informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets, even in markets with costless
advertising, and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies.
Xavier Gabaix
Department of Economics
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When consumers make mistakes, ﬁrms will try to exploit those mistakes.1 In some markets,
competitive pressure may undermine such exploitation.2 For example, competing ﬁrms could
reveal the exploitation and win over customers. In this paper, we identify when such competitive
debiasing will and will not occur. We study the market for add-ons – e.g. printer cartridges –
and develop an idea ﬁrst proposed by Glenn Ellison [2005, section V.C], who suggests that some
consumers do not think about add-ons when they buy a base good. We formalize this consumer
error and determine when competition will lead to debiasing.
Our paper is motivated by the observation that ﬁrms choose to hide information from consumers.
For example, banks prominently advertise the virtues of their accounts, but the marketing materials
do not highlight the costs of such an account which include ATM usage fees, bounced check fees,
minimum balance fees, etc. Banks could compete on these costs, but they instead choose to shroud
them. Indeed, many bank customers do not learn the details of the fee structure until long after
they have opened their accounts.
Cruickshank [2000] reports results of a U.K. Treasury survey that investigates the origins of high
fees in the U.K. banking sector. Half of the respondents report having no information about the
fees for common ﬁnancial services at their own bank.3 The report concludes that “In the markets
to supply banking services to personal customers [...] few consumers are aware of the terms and
conditions of the products they hold, pointing to signiﬁcant information problems.”
The printer market operates in a similar way. Printer manufacturers advertise the low price of
their inkjet printers, but do not compete on the principal cost of ownership: patented ink cartridges
that cost ten times more than the printer itself over the life of the product. Hall [2003] reports that
only 3 percent of printer owners claim to know the printing cost at the time they buy their printers.
Indeed, printer manufacturers try to make these costs invisible. For example, the printing cost
1A growing literature models markets in which sophisticated ﬁrms interact with consumers who may have psycho-
logical biases. For example, see DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004], Gabaix, Laibson and Li [2005], Glaeser [2005],
Heidhues and Koszegi [2005], Jin and Leslie [2003], Koszegi and Rabin [2006], Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005], Oster
and Morton [2005], Shui and Ausubel [2004], Spiegler [2004], and Ellison [forth.] for an overview.
2See Becker [1957] and Laibson and Yariv [2005].
3Respondents were asked “How accurately do you feel you know the charge for services on your account?” Response
categories included: “Exactly,” “Roughly,” “Not at all,” and “Did not apply.” About half of respondents choose
“Not at all.”
2of personal Hewlett-Packard deskjet printers is not easily accessible on the company’s web site.
From each printer’s homepage, one must follow a complex sequence of links to uncover the cost of
printing. Such shrouding does not reﬂect exogenous communication costs. The information about
printing costs is further away from the printer homepage – using the click metric – than any
other information about the printer.
At ﬁrst glance, shrouding add-on prices seems like a natural marketing strategy. However,
if consumers are all rational (or aware), shrouding should actually hurt the bank or printer man-
ufacturer, because rational consumers will expect the worse from a ﬁrm that shrouds [Milgrom
1981]. Any information that is hidden in the ﬁne print – or excluded from marketing materials
altogether – is not likely to be favorable to consumers. Rational consumers will infer that hidden
prices are likely to be high prices. Such reasoning creates an incentive for information revelation
and unravelling of shrouding. Indeed, all ﬁrms choose to unshroud their prices in equilibria with
rational consumers.
We show that shrouding behavior will arise if “myopic” consumers incompletely analyze the
future game tree. Some economists believe that such shrouding cannot survive [Shapiro 1995],
arguing that competitive ﬁrms should educate other ﬁrms’ customers, oﬀer those customers eﬃcient
pricing schemes, and consequently win their business. In contrast, we show that the existence of
myopic consumers creates equilibrium shrouding that is immune to such competitive pressure.
We derive conditions under which competitive price cutting and educational advertising will not
occur in equilibrium. We show that debiased consumers prefer to give their business to ﬁrms with
high shrouded prices because these sophisticated consumers end up with a subsidy from policies
designed for myopic customers [DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, 2005].4
To develop intuition for our results, consider a hotel room that costs Hilton $100 to supply.
Suppose that all consumers are initially myopic (i.e., they do not think about add-ons when they
plan a hotel visit). When such a customer stays at Hilton, she ends up paying $20 to purchase
add-ons like parking, telecommunications, room service, etc. Without loss of generality, assume
that these add-ons cost Hilton nothing to provide. In a competitive market, Hilton will then
advertise “Hilton’s rooms cost only $80,” neglecting to mention the costly add-ons that eﬀectively
raise its revenue. In competitive equilibrium, Hilton’s costs ($100) equal Hilton’s total revenues
($80+$20).
4In DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004, 2005] cross-subsidies arise from self-control problems. Naive consumers
who do not recognize their self-control problems cross-subsidize sophisticated consumers who do.
3Now consider another hotel chain, called Transparent, that is picking a business strategy. Trans-
parent could tell consumers about the shrouded add-ons that consumers pay for at Hilton.5 Trans-
parent could advertise, “Watch out for add-on prices at our competitors. Tranparents’s add-ons
are all free.” Naturally, if Transparent did this, they could not subsidize their room fees with add-on
revenue. An aggressive transparency strategy would be to charge $100 for rooms and nothing for
add-ons.
Unfortunately, this eﬃcient pricing scheme might not attract any customers. Once consumers
understand the high mark-up strategy of Hilton, consumers might prefer to stay at Hilton and
simply substitute away from add-on consumption. A “sophisticated” customer anticipates the
marked up add-ons at Hilton and avoids buying many of them (e.g., she brings a cell phone instead
of relying on the hotel phone, she takes a taxi instead of renting a car that requires parking,
etc.). Suppose that the economic cost of such substitution is $10. In this case, Hilton’s newly
educated customers prefer to stay at Hilton rather than defecting to marginal cost pricing at
Transparent. Hilton’s educated customers receive a $100 room for $80 and only have to endure
a little inconvenience (worth $10) to avoid buying Hilton’s overpriced add-ons. So Transparent’s
education campaign hurts Hilton – which sells fewer add-ons – but helps Hilton’s customers, who
are taught to substitute away from add-ons.6 After the educational advertising campaign, nobody
defects to Transparent, even though Transparent has marginal-cost pricing. Hilton is a better deal
for sophisticated consumers. Hence, Transparent’s unshrouding/advertising campaign does not
attract any business. The present paper generalizes this example.7
This example also illustrates the curse of debiasing. This curse occurs whenever debiasing
makes a consumer less proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ed e b i a s i n gﬁrm. Sophisticated consumers tend to be less
proﬁtable because they know how to avoid unecessary costs. In such cases, ﬁrms do not have an
incentive to pursue debiasing and competition will not lead consumers to behave rationally. There
are many markets in which ﬁrms do not have an incentive to educate their own customers or even
the customers of their competitors. Consider the illustrative example above. Debiased Hilton
customers, get a $100 hotel room for a price of $80 plus $10 of inconvenience. Hence, the debiased
consumer has no reason to defect to Transparent. Accordingly, Transparent (or Hilton) has no
5For concreteness, assume that all consumers receive and understand this message and assume that advertising is
free. However, the example works no matter what fraction 0 <λ≤ 1 of consumers get the message and no matter
what it costs to place such advertisements.
6Of course, Hilton would like to screen out such sophisticated consumers, but this is typically not possible.
7In the notation of section II, c =1 0 0 , b c =0 ,µ=0 ,e=1 0 ,α=0 ,λ∈ (0,1],p=8 0 , b p = p =2 0 .
4incentive to educate Hilton’s myopic consumers in the ﬁrst place. Debiasing a consumer is good
for the consumer and bad for both ﬁrms. Neither ﬁrm has an incentive to do it.8
In essence, we show that there are two kinds of exploitation. Firms exploit myopic consumers.
In turn, when consumers become sophisticated, they take advantage of these exploitative ﬁrms.
Finally, when sophisticated consumers exist, ﬁrms cannot rid themselves of them.9 In equilibrium,
nobody has an incentive to deviate except the myopic consumers. But the myopes do not know
any better and often nobody has an incentive to show them the error of their ways. Educating
a myopic consumer turns him into a (less proﬁtable) sophisticated consumer who prefers to go to
ﬁrms with loss-leader base good pricing and high-priced (but avoidable) add-ons. Hence, education
does not help the educating ﬁrm.
This mechanism applies to a wide range of markets. An educated banking customer gets the
beneﬁt of a $50 gift for opening an account and avoids paying some of the fees that snare myopic
consumers. An educated credit card holder gets convenience, ﬂoat, and miles and avoids paying
interest charges and late payment fees.10 An educated home printer buyer gets a loss-leader price
and avoids paying for frequent cartridge replacements (by printing in black and white instead of
color, printing in draft mode, or printing fewer large jobs at home).11 In such markets educated
consumers prefer to stick with the ﬁrms that feature high add-on prices, since these ﬁrms have
loss-leader base-good prices, and the educated consumer can partially substitute away from the
overpriced add-ons.
Our analysis shows why high add-on markups will persist in markets with numerous competitors
and free advertising. This prediction distinguishes our model from standard search models, which
8Another example of the curse of debiasing occurs in mutual funds. If a mutual fund company explains that
stock picking is not eﬀective and that fees are the primary predictable component in risk-adjusted returns, a newly
educated consumer will decide to buy an index fund — a very competitive, and relatively unproﬁtable, segment of the
market. Educating the consumer transforms him into an unproﬁtable consumer, and for-proﬁt companies will not
want to implement such education [Gabaix, Laibson and Li 2005].
9In the example above, Hilton cannot drive away educated consumers without also losing its myopic consumers.
10In recent years, a new shrouding ploy has emerged. For example, Chase oﬀers 0 percent Annual Percentage Rate
(APR) on transferred balances. In a footnote in their ads the company acknowledges that “we apply payments to
introductory balances before balances with higher APRs [...] Learn more about rates, fees, and other cost information
by reviewing Pricing & Terms.” In the ﬁne print of Pricing & Terms, Chase reports, “You authorize us to allocate
your payments and credits in a way that is most favorable or convenient for us. For example, you authorize us to
apply your payments and credits to balances with lower APRs (such as promotional APRs) before balances with
higher APRs.” Sophisticates can take advantage of this scheme by transferring a balance to Chase and never using
the Chase card to make a purchase. In contrast, myopes may fail to realize that they can only repay their new credit
card charges (which may accumulate at a high interest rate) after they have repaid their introductory balance (which
accumulate at a 0% interest rate). We thank Robert Barro for pointing out this example.
11A sophisticated consumer could also purchase the add-on from a third party, at some transaction cost. This is
why base-good ﬁrms often hinder such third party transactions. See Salop [1993] and Hall [2003] for examples.
5imply that ﬁrms have an incentive to disseminate information about their products and choose not
to do so only if such dissemination is costly (e.g., Butters [1977]; Salop and Stiglitz [1977]; and
Stahl [1989]).12 We identify conditions under which ﬁrms will choose not to advertise and hence
not compete by lowering add-on prices, even when advertising is free. This explains why industries
with nearly costless marginal information dissemination still shroud their add-on prices. In a search
model with only rational consumers, ﬁrms will choose to disclose all of their information if they can
do so costlessly. In our model, with enough myopic consumers, shrouding is the more proﬁtable
strategy.
As we have explained, our explanation for add-on shrouding and high markups depends on the
presence of myopic consumers.13 In contrast, many authors have developed rational actor models
that explain why add-ons have high markups. However, these rational models do not explain
why ﬁrms gratuitously shroud add-on prices. Two types of explanations for high mark-ups ﬁgure
prominently in the literature: high exogenous search costs14 and an inability to commit15.
Ellison [2005] proposes a rational price-discrimination model in which add-on pricing enables
ﬁrms to charge high demand consumers relatively more than low demand consumers.16 In Ellison’s
model, exogenous search costs make it costly for consumers to observe add-on prices. High add-on
markups raise proﬁts by facilitating price discrimination. However, Ellison points out that high
markups will not be sustainable when information transmission is inexpensive (i.e., when search
costs are exogenously small, see Stole [2005]). To handle this case, Ellison suggests an extension that
would incorporate unsophisticated consumers who would not buy a base-good if they anticipated
its total cost including the add-on. We work out a closely related model that incorporates myopia
and diﬀerent degrees of competition. In our setting, unsophisticated consumers simply fail to
take the add-on into account when comparing products. Hence, they only compare the prices
12This can be viewed as the key diﬀerence between modelling bounded rationality as search costs [e.g., Salop and
Stiglitz 1977] and modelling it directly as failure to anticipate an attribute as in our model. In the search cost
approach, if ﬁrms can costlessly educate the consumers, they will do so because consumers are Bayesian. If a ﬁrm
goes out of its way to sustain high search costs, Salop and Stiglitz consumers will rationally infer that it has something
to hide. So, if advertising costs are low, all ﬁrms reveal information to consumers.
13In contrast, Ayres and Nalebuﬀ [2003] propose that high add-on prices are partially due to myopic choices on
the part of ﬁrms, which would make more proﬁts if they had low add-on prices and consequently developed a good
reputation.
14Search-cost models imply that ﬁrms choose high add-on prices because it is exogenously costly for consumers to
observe add-on prices before they buy the base good [Diamond 1971; Lal and Matutes 1994; Stahl 1989; Hortacsu
and Syverson 2004]. In contrast, our model generates voluntary information suppression.
15The literature on commitment shows that ﬁrms choose high add-on prices if ﬁrms cannot commit to add-on prices
at the time the base good is sold (Borenstein et al. [1995], Farrell and Klemperer [2005], Klemperer [1987]). In our
analysis however, we consider the polar case in which ﬁrms can commit to an add-on price.
16See Ellison and Ellison [2004] for related empirical analysis.
6of base-good across ﬁrms, instead of comparing the total prices (base-good plus add-on). When
add-ons are made salient – e.g. through advertising – our newly educated consumers do not exit
the market, but instead make an more informed choice among the available goods. Our analysis
identiﬁes conditions under which no ﬁrm has an incentive to educate consumers in this way.
Section II deﬁnes a shrouded attribute and presents an equilibrium analysis of a market with
discrete demand for add-ons. Section III discusses extensions, including the general case with
continuous demand for add-ons. Section IV discusses the measurement and regulation of shrouded
markets. Section V concludes. All proofs are presented in appendices.
II. Shrouded Attributes: Deﬁnitions and a Model
We analyze a market in which ﬁrms can shroud attributes of their products. These shrouded
attributes are not taken into consideration by some potential customers. For example, a bank
might suppress information about minimum balance fees in the bank’s marketing materials. Some
consumers will neglect to consider such fees when picking a bank. For the purposes of our model, a
shrouded attribute is a product attribute that is hidden by a ﬁrm, even though the attribute could
be nearly costlessly revealed.17 The Hewlett-Packard decision to omit the deskjet price per page
on their web site is an example of such information suppression.
Shrouded attributes may include surcharges, fees, penalties, accessories, options, or any other
hidden feature of the ongoing relationship between a consumer and a ﬁrm. We divide this list into
two mutually exclusive categories: (avoidable) add-ons and (unavoidable) surcharges.
The analysis in this paper primarily discusses add-ons, the ﬁrst type of shrouded attribute.
Add-ons are complementary goods that consumers have the option to avoid. For example, hotel
guests can avoid paying telephone charges if they instead use cell phones. Likewise, hotel guests
can avoid paying for room service meals by ﬁnding local restaurants. Both hotel phone use and
hotel room service complement a hotel stay. Such complementary (voluntary) goods are referred
to as add-ons.
In our modeling, we distinguish between a “base good” and the shrouded attribute. In the
preceding example, the base good is a hotel room and the shrouded attributes are hotel services.
We assume that myopic consumers pick a base good without considering shrouded attributes.18
17More generally, communication costs need to be low enough so that unshrouding would occur in an equilibrium
with rational consumers.
18A consumer can compare prices of closely located four star hotels on a web travel site (e.g., Orbitz), without
7II.A. Timeline and overview of (discrete demand) shrouding game
We now discuss a model with discrete demand for the add-on. We postpone the general case
– i.e., continuous demand – to section III.B. We start by providing an overview of the timing of
the discrete demand game. We discuss the details of the game after the timeline.
Period 0:
• Firms decide to make information about the add-on shrouded or unshrouded.T h i s i s a
binary choice. Unshrouding a price is equivalent to advertising that price. To make un-
shrouding/advertising maximally attractive to the ﬁrm, we assume that unshrouding is free.19
• Firms pick prices for a base good (p) and an add-on (b p).
Period 1:
• Sophisticated consumers (fraction α<1 of the population) always take the add-on and its
price into consideration.20 If information about the add-on is shrouded, sophisticates form
Bayesian posteriors about the unobserved add-on.
• Myopic consumers (fraction 1−α of the population) only consider the add-on if they directly
observe the add-on information. When the add-on is shrouded, myopes do not observe the
add-on information. When the add-on is unshrouded, fraction λ ∈ (0,1] of myopes observes
the add-on information.
• Consumers choose a ﬁrm.
• Consumers can initiate costly behavior (eﬀort cost e) that enables them to substitute away
from future use of the add-on.
Period 2:
• Consumers observe the add-on price (if they have not observed it already) and are given an op-
portunity to purchase the add-on. Consumers who previously engaged in costly substitution
behavior have a lower incentive to purchase the add-on.
observing the hotels’ add-on pricing schedules. See Ayres and Nalebuﬀ [2003].
19We revisit this assumption in subsection III.D.
20We assume α<1 because the analysis is of interest only when there are myopic consumers. Also, when α =1 ,
many combinations of p and b p are equivalent, as the equilibrium determines only p + b p.
8II.B. Details of the shrouding game
To motivate the model, we will discuss the example of a bank, but the model applies to any
setting in which ﬁrms oﬀer add-ons to their customers.
Period 0: In period 0, banks set and potentially shroud prices. Let p represent the price of
a base good, which in our example is the price of opening a bank account. Let b p represent the
price of an add-on. In our example, violating the minimum balance is an add-on service with price
b p.21 Both p and b p a r ec h o s e nb ye a c hb a n ki np e r i o d0 . W i t h o u tl o s so fg e n e r a l i t y ,w ea s s u m e
that banks have zero marginal cost of opening an account or of having an account-holder violate
the minimum balance threshold.
Each bank may shroud or unshroud its minimum balance fee. If the bank chooses to shroud
b p, the minimum balance fee will not be seen by potential consumers. For example, b p may be
hidden in ﬁne print or published in an obscure location. One can think of this action as creating
a gratuitous search cost that is large enough so that few consumers bother to see the add-on price.
Without loss of generality, we assume that shrouding implies that no consumer observes the add-on
price.
The bank may alternatively costlessly advertise b p, thereby revealing it to all sophisticated
consumers and to λ fraction of myopic consumers, with 0 <λ≤ 1. Without loss of generality we
assume that λ is ﬁxed. We allow λ to be weakly less than unity to reﬂect the possibility that
myopes – who may not initially recognize the value of information about the add-on market –
may overlook that information even when it is made available. We deﬁne informed myopes as the
myopes that have seen (and noted) unshrouded information about the add-on. Informed myopes
behave exactly like sophisticated consumers. Analogously, we deﬁne uninformed myopes as those
myopes that have not seen information about the add-on. Hence, when information is unshrouded
by one or more ﬁrms, a fraction λ of myopes is informed – and therefore become sophisticated
– and a fraction 1 − λ of myopes is uninformed. Hence unshrouding by any ﬁrm increases the
sophistication of the pool of potential customers shared by all ﬁrms.22
Period 1:
21In US banks, a typical minimum balance fee is $10 and applies in months when an account balance falls below
some minimum that is strictly greater than zero. A minimum balance fee is distinct from an overdraft fee, a bounced-
check fee, or an insuﬃcient funds fee. Those fees apply to cases in which customers would like to use funds that they
do not have in their accounts. Naturally, the model discussed here applies to those fees as well.
22Assuming that the impact of advertising is more local would not change our results.
9Consumers pick a ﬁrm from which to buy the base good. Sophisticates always take the existence
of the add-on into consideration, forming Bayesian posteriors about the add-on when its price is
shrouded. Myopes only consider the add-on if it is revealed to them.
For a consumer, taking account of the add-on generates two sources of value. First, a consumer
can consider add-on pricing when choosing a ﬁrm. Second, a consumer who anticipates or observes
high add-on prices can exert costly eﬀort e>0 in period 1 and thereby substitute away from the
add-on. For example, a consumer who faces a high minimum balance fee could transfer balances
into the account or cut back withdrawals so that the fee is less likely to be invoked.
We assume that add-on fee b p is eﬀectively bounded above by p>e .23 For example, if a
customer is forced to pay a high fee, the customer might terminate her relationship with the bank
or lodge a complaint. Legal and regulatory constraints also limit the penalties/fees that banks can
charge. Finally, p could represent the cost of a last minute consumer intervention that enables the
consumer to avoid purchasing the add-on.
We assume that sophisticates and informed myopes are aware of the add-on fee. Hence,
sophisticates and informed myopes will exert substitution eﬀort e if e<Eb p.24
Let xi represent the anticipated net surplus from opening an account at bank i less the antic-
ipated net surplus from opening an account at the best alternative bank (ignoring idiosyncratic
taste diﬀerences). Throughout the paper we use starred variables to represent the (symmetric)
prices set by other ﬁrms. We analyze symmetric equilibria in this paper.25
For sophisticated consumers,
xi =[ −pi − min{Eb p,e}] − [−p∗ − min{Eb p∗,e}],
where Eb p and Eb p∗ are the rational expectations about the add-on price of the ﬁrm, and its com-
petitors, respectively. When the add-on information is unshrouded, expectations are equal to the
true value of the add-on price. When the add-on information is shrouded, sophisticated consumers
solve the Bayesian equilibrium to calculate Eb p and Eb p∗.26
23If the add-on is unavoidable (e>p) and consumers are not all sophisticated (λ<1, α<1) then the proof of
Proposition 1 shows that there is a unique sequential equilibrium, which has Shrouded Prices and p = −p+µ, b p = p.
24We assume local risk neutrality throughout the paper. Also, it is important that informed myopes behave like
sophisticates.
25Technically, our equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium, as detailed in the preamble of the proof of Proposition 1.
26We commit some abuse of language here. When the add-on information is shrouded, the sophisticated consumers’
beliefs are part of a consistent assessment (i.e. a strategic proﬁle and a belief system), in particular they anticipate
perfectly the price that the ﬁrm charges in equilibrium.
10Myopic consumers fall into two classes. When add-on prices are unshrouded, a fraction λ
of myopes becomes informed. These informed myopes behave just like sophisticates with Eb p =
b p. A myope that was educated by ﬁrm i becomes sophisticated in his behavior vis-a-vis all
ﬁrms. However, even when add-on information is unshrouded, a fraction 1−λ of myopes remains
uninformed. When add-on information is shrouded, all myopes are uninformed.
For uninformed myopes,
xi = −pi + p∗.
Uninformed myopes neglect the add-on when deciding where to open their bank account. Likewise,
uninformed myopic consumers do not consider exerting substitution eﬀort e in period 1.
Let D(xi) represent the probability that a consumer opens an account at bank i.R e c a l l t h a t xi
represents the average anticipated net surplus from opening an account at bank i less the average
anticipated net surplus from opening an account at the best alternative bank. The demand function
D is strictly increasing, bounded below by zero, and bounded above by one. Appendix 1 presents
a microfoundation of the demand function. The demand function allows us to ﬂexibly parametrize
the degree of competion in the industry, via the quantity µ = D(0)/D0 (0),w h i c hw i l lt u r no u t
to be equal to the average proﬁt per consumer. In particular, perfect competition corresponds to
µ =0 .
Period 2:
Consumers observe the add-on price (if they have not observed it already) and are given an
opportunity to purchase the add-on. Consumers who have engaged in substitution in period 1 do
not purchase the add-on. All other consumers purchase the add-on at price b p.27
II.C. Symmetric equilibrium
We now characterize the symmetric sequential equilibrium of this game.28 Let α represent the
share of sophisticated consumers in the marketplace. The following proposition shows that ﬁrms
will choose high markups in the add-on market. In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, ﬁrms will
choose markups that are so high that the sophisticated consumers substitute out of the add-on
market.
27Alternatively, we could assume that uninformed myopes buy the add-on in period 2 without observing the price:
i.e., the myopes believe that the unobserved add-on price is low enough to justify the purchase.
28The proof of Proposition 1, in Appendix 2, provides the details of the strategies and beliefs.
11Proposition 1 Let
(1) α† ≡ 1 − e/p
and
(2) µ = D(0)/D0 (0).
If the fraction of sophisticated consumers α is less than α†, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
in which ﬁrms shroud the add-on price. Call this the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium. The prices of
the base good and the add-on are respectively:
p = −(1 − α)p + µ (3)
b p = p. (4)
In this equilibrium only myopes purchase the add-on. The allocation is ineﬃcient since sophisticates
substitute away from the add-on.
If the fraction of sophisticated consumers α is greater than α†, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
in which ﬁrms do not shroud the add-on price. Call this the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium. The
prices of the base good and the add-on are respectively:
p = −e + µ (5)
b p = e. (6)
In this equilibrium all consumers purchase the add-on, so the equilibrium is eﬃcient.
In each of these equilibria, the beliefs of sophisticated consumers and educated myopes are b p = p
for the add-on price at a ﬁrm that shrouds, independently of its base good price. Also, the total
proﬁts of the industry are µ.
The proof is in Appendix 2.
12Proposition 1 characterizes a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium29 in which ﬁrms choose ineﬃciently
high markups in the add-on market and choose to shroud those add-on prices.30 In the Shrouded
Prices Equilibrium, ﬁrms set b p∗ = p, though the marginal cost of producing the add-on is 0. This
equilibrium is ineﬃcient since the sophisticates pay eﬀort cost e to substitute away from add-on
consumption (see subsection II.D below).
Our model reproduces the well-known result that high markups for the add-on are oﬀset by low
or negative markups on the base good.31 This is easiest to see when the market is approximately
competitive (i.e., the demand curve is highly elastic, and hence µ is close to zero). In a relatively
competitive market with small µ, the base good is always a loss leader with a negative markup:
p∗ ≈−(1 − α)p<0 or p∗ ≈− e<0. The model implies that the add-on will be the “proﬁt-center”
and the base good will be the “loss leader.”32
Our model also predicts equilibrium shrouding, as conjectured by Ellison [2005]. Other previous
authors have conjectured that the availability of inexpensive advertising would drive down after-
market prices and eliminate shrouding. For example, Shapiro [1995] describes the ineﬃciency
caused by high markups in the aftermarket and then observes that competition and advertising
should drive them away.
Furthermore, manufacturers in a competitive equipment market have incentives to
a v o i de v e nt h i si n e ﬃciency by providing information to consumers. A manufacturer
could capture proﬁts by raising its [base-good] prices above market levels (i.e., closer
to cost), lowering its aftermarket prices below market levels (i.e., closer to cost), and
informing buyers that its overall systems price is at or below market. In this fashion,
the manufacturer could eliminate some or all of the deadweight loss, attract consumers
by oﬀering a lower total cost of ownership, and still capture as proﬁts some of the
eliminated deadweight loss. In other words, and unlike traditional monopoly power,
the manufacturers have a direct incentive to eliminate even the small ineﬃciency caused
29It is easy to see that if α + λ(1 − α) <α
† and there is a small cost of unshrouding, then the Shrouded Prices
Equilibrium is the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium. When λ is large enough another equilibrium exists.
Speciﬁcally, when α<α
† <α+ λ(1 − α), the Shrouded Prices and Unshrouded Prices Equilibria both exist.
30For empirical applications,we reexpress Proposition 1 in the case where the marginal costs c and b c ≤ e are not
zero. In this case, if α<α
†, p = c − (1 − α)(p − b c)+µ,a n di fα>α
†, p = c + b c − e + µ.T h ev a l u eo fb p does not
change.
31See the literature review in the present paper and in Ellison [2005].
32In many seemingly competitive markets the price of the base good is typically set below its marginal cost (e.g.,
printer, hotel, car rental, ﬁnancial services), while the price of the add-on is set well above its marginal cost (printer
cartridge, hotel phone call, gas charge, minimum balance fee).
13by poor consumer information [Shapiro 1995, p. 495].
In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, Shapiro’s intuition about ineﬃciency applies, but his an-
ticipated unshrouding eﬀects are overturned by other forces. In general, high markups in the
aftermarket do not go away as a result of competition or advertising.
Why doesn’t Shapiro’s unshrouding eﬀect arise? Shapiro conjectures that ﬁrms will compete
by advertising low add-on prices, thereby attracting consumers by highlighting the beneﬁts of
eﬃciently priced add-ons.
However, Proposition 1 shows that this competitive eﬀect is overturned by a “curse of debiasing.”
Speciﬁcally, educated consumers would prefer to frequent ﬁrms with high add-on prices that they
can avoid rather than defecting to ﬁrms with marginal cost pricing of both the base good and the
add-on.
Again consider the illustrative case of perfect competition, µ =0 . If a sophisticated consumer
g i v e sh e rb u s i n e s st oaﬁrm with shrouded market prices, the sophisticated consumer’s surplus will
be:
sophisticated surplus = −p − e
=( 1 − α)p − e
> (1 − α)p − (1 − α)p
=0 .
By contrast, if the sophisticated consumer gives her business to a ﬁrm with zero markups on both
the base good and the add-on, the sophisticate’s surplus will be exactly 0.33 So the sophisti-
cated/educated consumer is strictly better oﬀ at the ﬁrm with shrouded prices (and high add-on
markups), than deviating to the ﬁrm with marginal cost pricing.
This preference for the ﬁrms with high mark-ups reﬂects the fact that the sophisticated con-
sumers are subsidized by pricing policies designed for uninformed myopic consumers. Educating
uninformed myopes enables them to get more value out of their relationships with high markup
ﬁrms. After education, myopes anticipate the high add-on prices, and hence substitute away from
add-ons while still enjoying loss leader prices on the base good. The newly educated consumers
33The particular value of a 0 surplus depends on the choice of normalization. If we shift all utilities by a factor V ,
the surplus will be V .
14beneﬁt from the “free gifts” and avoid the high fees.34
This generates the curse of debiasing. A ﬁrm does not beneﬁt by debiasing uninformed myopic
consumers. Newly educated consumers (i.e., sophisticates) are not proﬁtable to any ﬁrm. Specif-
ically, sophisticates prefer to patronize – and in particular, exploit – ﬁrms that oﬀer loss-leader
prices on base-goods.
This intuitive analysis explores pricing deviations in which a ﬁrm tries to educate and attract
myopes from other ﬁrms (using low markups as the lure). Naturally, equilibrium analysis must
also analyze deviations in which a ﬁrm with high markups tries to drive away (money-losing)
sophisticates. Naturally, both deviations must be considered in the proofs of Proposition 1.
In summary, the presence of uninformed myopic consumers incentivizes ﬁrms to adopt pricing
schedules that have the unintended consequence of subsidizing sophisticates. Making more myopes
sophisticated will not help any ﬁrm. Because of this curse of debiasing, no ﬁrm has an incentive
to educate myopes, even when education is costless.
II.D. Welfare
We now provide a welfare analysis of the Shrouded Price Equilibrium and highlight the ineﬃ-
ciency of this equilibrium.35
Proposition 2 In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, the social welfare loss is Λ = αe. Sophisticated
consumers are p−e units better oﬀ than myopic consumers. In the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium,
there is no ineﬃciency and all consumers are equally well-oﬀ.
Proof of Proposition 2. The social welfare loss is proportional (with factor e) to the fraction of
agents that exerts costly eﬀort e to avoid consuming the add-on. Recall that the ﬁrms can produce
the add-on at 0 marginal cost. In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, all of the sophisticated agents
exert eﬀort e, so the deadweight loss is αe. Also, as sophisticates pay e to avoid buying the add-on,
and myopes pay p, sophisticates are p − e better oﬀ than myopes.
In the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium, no consumers exert costly eﬀort, and all purchase the
add-on, which is produced at 0 marginal cost. There is no eﬃciency loss.¤
34In Proposition 1, indeed, one needs λ>0, but otherwise the speciﬁc value of λ does not matter. The reason is
clear from the proof. Sophisticates are less proﬁtable than myopes, so after unshrouding an increase in the number
of sophisticates, caused by λ>0, reduces total proﬁts.
35As often in welfare economics, the pricing distortion is likely to have greater redistributional eﬀects than net
eﬃciency losses.
15Since the add-on can be produced at zero social cost,36 it is socially eﬃcient for the add-on to be
consumed. If a consumer substitutes away from the add-on (at eﬀort cost e), then an equilibrium is
socially ineﬃcient. In the case with ineﬃciency (α<α †), the welfare losses increase as the fraction
of sophisticates increases; in this case sophisticates do not consume the (high-priced) add-on.
III. Extensions
In this section we discuss several extensions of the model. First, we discuss the case in which
myopes learn to become sophisticates. Second, we analyze the case of continuous demand for the
add-on. Finally, we discuss a series of additional considerations that inﬂuence the persistence of
shrouding.
III.A. Learning
In some markets, myopes eventually learn the high price of the add-on, thereby becoming
sophisticates. We present an extension that reﬂects this learning process and demonstrate how
learning aﬀects equilibrium pricing.
We adopt the same timing as before, but now we assume that the decision about add-on
consumption is repeated. Speciﬁcally, after choosing a ﬁrm from which to buy the base-good,
sophisticates face the add-on purchase decision TS times. For each decision, sophisticates decide
whether to pay avoidance cost e or buy the add-on for price b p. Informed myopes act just like
sophisticates. Uninformed myopes buy the add-on TMM times.37 They then become sophisticates
and make sophisticated choices TMS times.38 Our original model corresponds to TS = TMM =1
and TMS =0 .39 We assume that ﬁrms choose their shrouding policies and prices once and for all
and do not change them during the game.
The following Proposition shows that there is a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium if the fraction of
sophisticates α is low.
36This assumption is made without loss of generality.
37In practice, the propensity to become sophisticated should increase with the cost of behaving myopically. This
w o u l dl e a dt oa ni n t e r e s t i n ge x t e n s i o no ft h ef r a m e w o r k .
38I ns o m ec a s e si sm a yb en a t u r a lt oa s s u m eTS = TMM + TMS, but we do not make this assumption here, the
Shrouded Prices Equlibrium does not depend on it.
39See Miao [2005] for another analysis.
16Proposition 3 Let
(7) α†† ≡ 1 −
e
p
max(TS,T MM + TMS)
TMM
.
If α<α ††, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms shroud the add-on pricing.
Call this the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium:
p = −(1 − α)pTMM + µ (8)
b p = p.
In this equilibrium the myopes purchase the add-on until they become sophisticates. The allo-
cation is socially ineﬃcient since sophisticates substitute away from the add-on. The beliefs of
sophisticated consumers and educated myopes are b p = p for the add-on price at ﬁrms that shroud.
The myopia model predicts that consumers will eventually learn to avoid add-on fees. Agarwal
et al. [2005] empirically evaluate these dynamics, conﬁrming the prediction that add-on fees in
banks decline with customer tenure. This learning pattern is inconsistent with the predictions of
a classical price discrimination model of add-on pricing.
Our analysis raises the question of long-run dynamics. If consumers learn to avoid add-on fees,
does shrouding eventually vanish along with high add-on prices? Several countervailing forces may
sustain shrouding in the long-run. First, new generations of myopic consumers enter the market.
Second, sophistication is sometimes overturned by forgetting or distraction, particularly when the
absolute costs of the add-on are small. Third, and most importantly, new shrouding techniques
endogenously evolve. For example, the emphasis on fee-based revenue in the banking sector is a
recent development [Rogers and Sinkey 1999]
We believe that fees for speciﬁc add-ons have a lifecycle. When the add-on is new it tends
to be shrouded and priced above marginal cost. Over time, shrouding decreases and the add-on
price falls. Using our notation, the fraction α of sophisticates increases over time and shrouding
eventually disappears.40
40We thank Douglas Bernheim for suggesting these lifecycle dynamics.
17III.B. Continuous add-on demand
In this section, we generalize the model to the case of continuous demand for the add-on.
We show that equilibrium shrouding survives only when sophisticates have relatively inexpensive
substitutes for the add-on. The structure and timing of the game in this section mirrors the
details of the original game except for the extensions enumerated below.
Total consumer utility is decomposed into two parts: the value of owning the base good and the
cost of purchasing – or substituting away from – the add-on. Let uai represent agent a’s value of
ﬁrm i’s base good, overlooking the add-on.41 Let b u(b eai, b qai) − b pib qai represent the costs associated
with the add-on, reﬂecting both the add-on quantity b qai and any costly eﬀorts b eai to substitute
away from the add-on. The leading case is ∂2b u(b eai, b qai)/∂b eai∂b qai ≤ 0. The net value of buying the
base good can be written
uai − pi | {z } + b u(b eai, b qai) − b pib qai | {z }
base good utility add-on utility
.
In period 1, sophisticated consumer a picks a ﬁrm i and substitution eﬀort b eai to maximize






[b u(b eai, b qai) − b pib qai]
¾
.
In period 2, sophisticates pick b qai to maximize b u(b eai, b qai) − b pib qai.W ec a l lb uS (b pi)=b u(b eai, b qai) the
corresponding indirect utility for the rational expectations case in which b pi = Eb pi.42
Informed myopes behave just like sophisticates, since informed myopes observe the add-on
i n f o r m a t i o ni np e r i o d1 .
In contrast, uninformed myopes do not take account of the add-on when they pick a ﬁrm i.I n
period 1, uninformed myopes pick a ﬁrm i to maximize uai − pi.
Uninformed myopes passively choose a default level of substitution eﬀort in period 1 b eM
ai which






− b pib qai.
We call c the the marginal cost of the base good and b c the marginal cost of manufacturing
the add-on. Let b qS (b p) represent the equilibrium add-on demand of a sophisticate who knows she
will face a price b p.L e t b qM (b p) represent the equilibrium add-on demand of an uninformed myopic
41For example uai could represent the value of the base good assuming a zero price for the add-on.
42b u
S (b pi)=b u(b eai, b qai)=b u(b eai(Eb pi), b qai(b eai(Eb pi), b pi)) = b u(b eai(b pi), b qai(b eai(b pi), b pi)).
18who initially overlooks add-on prices because they are shrouded. We assume that there is a unique
monopoly price in the add-on market, given by
(9) b pm =a r gm a x
b p
(b p − b c)
£
αb qS (b p)+( 1− α) b qM (b p)
¤
.
Now we characterize symmetric sequential equilibria.
Proposition 4 Suppose that unshrouding makes all consumers sophisticated (λ =1 ). The price
vector
p = c − (b p − b c)b q(b p)+µ (10)
b p = b pm (11)
supports a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium if and only if B ≥ 1,w h e r eB is the debiasing ratio:
B =
cross-subsidy to sophisticates from myopes
loss of social surplus (for sophisticate demand) due to add-on mark-up
(12)
=
(1 − α)(b pm − b c)
¡
b qM (b pm) − b qS (b pm)
¢
[b uS (b c) − b cb qS (b c)] − [b uS (b pm) − b cb qS (b pm)]
(13)
The beliefs of sophisticated consumers and educated myopes are b p = b pm for the add-on price at
ﬁrms that shroud.
The proof is in Appendix 2.
This no-advertising result contains a boundary condition that determines when advertising will
appear: B ≥ 1.43 Advertising does not arise when the cross-subsidies to sophisticates are larger
than the social welfare distortions due to price deviations from marginal cost. An empirical test
of this theory would calculate B ratios in diﬀerent markets, and determine whether markets with
high B values tend to be more shrouded.
To heuristically derive the result, consider another ratio that is easier to directly interpret:
B0 =
loss-leader subsidy in base-good market
loss of consumer surplus (for sophisticate demand) due to add-on mark-up
(14)
=
(b pm − b c)
£
αb qS (b pm)+( 1− α) b qM (b pm)
¤
[b uS (b c) − b cb qS (b c)] − [b uS (b pm) − b pmb qS (b pm)]
(15)
43With the discrete demand model of section 2, the subsidy is (1 − α)p, the distortion is e,s oB = B
0 =( 1− α)p/e.
Condition B ≥ 1 is α ≤ α
†, reproducing the result of Proposition 1.
19A sophisticate at a shrouded ﬁrm will not defect to a marginal cost pricing ﬁrm if the loss-leader
subsidy in the base-good market exceeds the consumer welfare gain from switching to marginal cost
pricing in the add-on market (i.e., B0 ≥ 1). Since aftermarket proﬁt generates loss-leader competi-
tion in the base-good market, the loss-leader base-good subsidy is (b pm − b c)
£
αb qS (b pm)+( 1− α) b qM (b pm)
¤
,
which is the average proﬁt per customer in the add-on market. The denominator of B0 is the sophis-
ticates’ welfare loss from high mark-ups in the add-on market. At marginal cost pricing (b p = b c), the
sophisticate would realize add-on utility of b uS (b c)−b cb qS (b c), but in the shrouded prices equilibrium
the sophisticate pays add-on price b pm and realizes a lower add-on utility of b uS (b pm) − b pmb qS (b pm).
Putting these results together, we get the expression of B0 in equation 15. We can recover B (equa-
tion 13) by subtracting (b pm − b c) b qS (b pm) from both the numerator and denominator of B0.H e n c e
B ≥ 1 iﬀ B0 ≥ 1.
III.C. Additional models of shrouded equilibria
In this subsection, we discuss some tractable variants of our model that are empirically relevant.
One variant is that of “observable prices but limited awareness.”44 In this version, the prices of all
ﬁrms are always observable, at no cost, by all consumers. Myopes, however, just do not consider
(or even think of) the price of the add-on. In contrast, sophisticates costlessly observe and take
into account the add-on prices of all ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm “unshrouds,” it educates the myopes (or a
fraction λ of them), and makes them aware of the existence of the add-on. The results of this
variant are very close to the results of the present framework. The results of Proposition 1 — the
discrete demand model — do not change. The results of Proposition 4 — the continuous demand
model — do not change, except that the add-on price charged in the Shrouded Equilibrium falls
between marginal cost and the monopoly price. The reason is that, if a ﬁrm lowers the price of the
add-on, it gets more sophisticated consumers.
In another variant, myopic consumers simply underestimate their use of the add-on.45 This
variant is relevant when consumers are overoptimistic about the use of credit cards [Ausubel 1991]
or lines of credit [Landier and Thesmar 2005]. Such a microfoundation would not change the results
of the present paper.
The model also makes predictions about which attributes will be shrouded, for a given good.
Indeed, one can generalize the model to a good with several shrouded attributes, which may have
44This variant is developed in the May 2004 version of the present paper, which is available upon request.
45Section 7.3 of our 2004 working paper.
20diﬀerent values for α, e and p. Our Proposition 1 also applies to each attributes. There will be a
Shrouded Prices Equilibrium for an attribute if α<1−e/p for that attribute. Hence an attribute
will be shrouded if its debiasing ratio B =( 1− α)p/e is greater than 1.
III.D. Other inﬂuences on shrouding
To simplify exposition, we have ignored several additional factors that inﬂuence the prevalence
of shrouding. In this subsection, we quickly discuss these factors, starting with the factors that
encourage shrouding. First, we have so far overlooked the consumer entry decision, since we have
assumed that all consumers must buy a base good. When some consumers overlook add-on costs,
these myopic consumers may buy the base good when they should avoid the market altogether
[Ellison 2005]. Think of a consumer who buys a $50 deskjet printer without realizing that the
lifetime operating costs are at least ten times higher.46 Firms that compete by unshrouding high
add-on prices will drive some of these myopic consumers out of the base-good market. Hence,
consumer entry decisions are adversely aﬀected by unshrouding [Spence 1977].
Second, we have so far assumed that once a consumer becomes informed about the costly add-on
at one ﬁrm, that consumer takes account of the costly add-ons at all ﬁrms. However, it is instead
possible that unshrouding by one ﬁrm leads consumers only to think about the unshrouded add-on
at that single ﬁrm. This narrow framing eﬀect would impede unshrouding.
Third, if education/advertising is costly, then unshrouding will again be impeded. Speciﬁcally,
suppose there is a ﬁxed cost C of unshrouding. Then Proposition 4 is adjusted so that a Shrouded
Prices Equilibrium exists iﬀ B ≥ 1, where B is deﬁned as before except the numerator of B
is incremented by kC, where k =1if µ =0and k equals the number of ﬁrms if µ is very
large.47 Analogously Proposition 1 is adjusted so that a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium exists iﬀ
(1−α)p+kC > e. This implies that shrouding is more pervasive when the market is less competitive.
Fourth, we have already mentioned that learning will accelerate unshrouding. However, inno-
vation will create new add-ons and new opportunities for shrouding.
Some forces besides learning, however, will favor unshrouding. For instance, if consumers have
heterogeneous tastes and ﬁrms have heterogeneous add-ons, ﬁrms will advertise to enable con-
46At the moment, black and white text costs between 2 cents and 15 cents per page, depending on the inkjet
printer. Color text costs more than black and white text. A photographic image costs an order of magnitude more.
Printing 10 pages per day at only 10 cents a page costs $1460 over four years.
47T h ep r o o fi sas i m p l em o d i ﬁcation of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4, with a Taylor expansion when µ is very
large.
21sumers to ﬁnd the base-good with the right add-on. This informative advertising will accelerate
unshrouding.
Also, third party consumer education – e.g., magazines like Consumer Reports –w i l la c -
celerate unshrouding. However, various impediments prevent such educational mechanisms from
working perfectly. Non-proﬁt educational organizations may be underﬁnanced. Moreover, for-
proﬁt educational organizations may have incentives to give bad advice. For example, personal
ﬁnance magazines tend to recommend active portfolio management, thereby justifying ongoing
demand for these magazines. Consumers may not know which advisor to trust.
IV. Measuring and regulating shrouding
In this section we discuss the measurement and regulation of shrouding. We ﬁrst consider the
problem of a regulator – or an economic researcher – who wishes to empirically identify the
existence of shrouding. We then consider potential regulatory remedies, emphasizing both the
beneﬁts and pitfalls of these policies.
IV.A. Measuring shrouding: diagnostics
Five diﬀerent empirical strategies can be used to identify the existence of shrouding. First,
researchers may conduct consumer surveys. Such surveys would determine whether consumers at
the point of purchase are aware of the add-on costs that they will later face. This corresponds to
measuring α, an index of average “consumer I.Q.” For example, Hall [2003] ﬁnds that only 3% of
consumers who buy desk-jet printers know the associated ink costs at the time they purchase the
printer.48 Of course, such ignorance may or may not imply shrouding (e.g. ignorance may result
from exogenously high search costs). Consumer surveys might also test for incorrect consumer
expectations. For example, at the point of purchase consumers could be asked to estimate their ink
costs. In shrouded equilibria, a large fraction of consumers should underestimate such costs (and
relatively few consumers should overestimate those costs). Naturally, whenever possible, surveys
should use incentive compatible designs. For example, respondents could be told to estimate the
ink costs of a consumer who prints a speciﬁc number of pages per month and uses non-generic
cartridges. With such a set-up, accurate beliefs could be ﬁnancially rewarded.
48Oﬃce of Fair Trading [2002] provides related evidence.
22Second, researchers could test comparative statics assumed or predicted by the model. The
model assumes that consumers show a greater response to up-front costs than to delayed costs.
More generally, the model assumes that consumers show a relatively muted response to complex,
contingent, camouﬂaged, distant, or disaggregated costs. Hausman [1979] and Hausman and Joskow
[1982] ﬁnd that consumers are far more responsive to the store prices of appliances (e.g. refrig-
erators) than to the net present value of the energy costs of operating the appliances. Barber,
Odean and Zheng [forthcoming] show that mutual fund investors are more sensitive to front-end
loads than to ongoing management fees. Hossain and Morgan [2005, 2006] ﬁnd that consumers
are more responsive to direct costs than to shipping charges, and more generally ﬁnd ﬁeld evidence
for shrouded attributes. Researchers could also study comparative statics by conducting controlled
experiments. A control group might receive standard (shrouded) marketing materials. A treat-
ment group would see the standard marketing material as well as an unshrouded statement of the
add-on costs. Choi et al. [2005] conduct a ﬁeld experiment with the structure above. They ﬁnd
that MBA students avoid investing in mutual funds with high management fees only when those
fees are explicitly unshrouded with an exogenous intervention.
Third, researchers could also determine whether ﬁrms gratuitously increase the search cost for
add-on prices. For instance, ﬁrms may make add-on prices much harder to ﬁnd than other less
important information.
Fourth, researchers may conduct product audits, which determine if base goods are being sold
at loss-leader prices and if add-ons are being sold at high mark-ups. Of course, loss-leader base
goods and high markups on add-ons are only necessary conditions for the existence of a shrouded
equilibrium.
Fifth, regulators could look for learning eﬀects implied by shrouded equilibria. If fees are initially
shrouded and consumers encounter these fees as they gain more experience with a product, then
consumers will slowly learn to avoid these fees (see section III.A). Indeed, the logic of shrouding
implies that learning eﬀects may generate reduced form preference reversals. For example, consider
two bank account holders: one consumer just triggered an add-on fee and the other consumer did
not. The consumer who just “bought” the add-on will have a lower future add-on demand compared
to the consumer who did not buy the add-on (since the latter consumer has a higher chance of still
being unaware of the add-on trap). Such dynamic demand reversals contradict standard theories
of add-on demand, which feature consumer heterogeneity and price discrimination. Agarwal et al.
[2005] ﬁnd learning eﬀects in the retail banking market. Other authors have argued that consumers
23with a better general education get better prices in the marketplace. Woodward [2003] ﬁnds that
more educated consumers pay less in the mortgage market controlling for default risk. Controlled
ﬁeld experiments can be designed to identify the eﬀect of unshrouding.
IV.B. Regulatory interventions
Shrouded equilibria generate economic ineﬃciencies. However regulatory remedies may not be
available. It is diﬃcult to outlaw ignorance or misleading (but accurate) marketing. If regulators
ﬁnd evidence for ineﬃcient shrouding, they have four types of (imperfect) regulatory remedies that
they might consider employing. Of course, the usual costs of regulation could easily outweight its
possible beneﬁt.
First, regulators may compel disclosure. For example, regulators could compel printer manu-
facturers to report the cost of ink of printed page in a prominent place on the product. Indeed,
regulators have occassionally adopted such unshrouding policies (e.g. nutrtitional labelling, energy
usage labelling, and ﬁnancial product labelling). However, disclosure laws for credit cards and
mortgages have met with only mixed success [Ausubel 1991, Woodward 2003]. Indeed, in most
markets it is diﬃcult to design and enforce a successful disclosure regulation. For example, how
would one compel banks to make ﬁnancial service fees salient? A bank account provides access to
thousands of complementary ﬁnancial services with associated fees (e.g., out-of-network ATM fees,
overdraft fees, bounced check fees, etc). There is no summary statistic like ink cost per page that
summarizes bank fees. Regulations will probably not succeed if they simply change the font size
of the ﬁne print. Nobody yet knows how to compel transparency. And it remains to be seen
whether that is desirable – or possible – in practice.
Second, regulators could simply warn consumers to pay attention to shrouded costs. For ex-
ample, required “warning labels” could be placed prominently on marketing materials, much like
cigarette warning labels. For example, mutual fund marketing materials could be required to con-
tain the following warning label: “Investors are urged to check loads, management fees, and other
charges before investing in any mutual fund. If these fees are not reported in marketing materials,
do not forget to ask about them.”49
Third, regulators could make add-on markets more competitive. For example, regulators
could require that printer manufacturers allow competitive entry in the printer cartridge market.
49The U.K. Treasury is in the midst of a broad expansion of transparency regulation in the banking sector [Cruick-
shank 2000].
24Right now, most printer manufacturers prevent such entry by designing cartridges with integrated
patented printer heads (instead of incorporating the printer head into the printer itself). Hall [2003]
contains an analysis of this anti-competitive practice. The famous Kodak copier case [Klein 1993]
presents another example of an add-on market in which competition was eﬀectively eliminated,
resulting in a supreme court decision against the aftermarket monopoly. However, we tend to be
skeptical of regulations that prevent companies from exerting market power. Such pro-competitive
regulations may have the unintended negative consequence of discouraging technological innovation.
Finally, regulators may impose markup caps on shrouded attributes.. For example, Singapore
regulates the mark-up the hotel charge for phone.50 However, even if good theoretical arguments
exist for regulating shrouded fees, such regulations put us on a slippery slope that may produce
great unintended harm. Mark-up regulations are often counterproductive.
V. Conclusion
Firms often shroud the negative attributes of their products, particularly high prices for com-
plementary add-ons. Following a suggestion by Ellison [2005], we present a model of consumer
myopia that explains such shrouding. We identify conditions under which shrouding survives in
competitive equilibrium. We show that competition will not induce ﬁrms to reveal information
that would improve market eﬃciency. Firms will not educate the public about the add-on market,
even when unshrouding is free.
A “curse of debiasing” suppresses unshrouding. Debiasing a consumer improves consumer
welfare, but no ﬁrm can capture or even partially share these beneﬁts. Firms receive lower proﬁts
when they interact with debiased consumers. Debiased consumers know how to avoid high-priced
items. Moreover, ﬁrms can’t drive away such debiased consumers without losing (proﬁtable)
myopic consumers as well. Debiased consumers can pretend to be myopes, enabling the debiased
consumers to take advantage of the traps that ﬁrms set for myopes.
The economics of shrouding suggest some new research questions. We would like to measure
the scope of ﬁrms’ eﬀorts to shroud information. We would like to measure the degree of consumer
myopia. Finally, we would like to know how quickly learning unshrouds information and how
quickly the fog returns as ﬁrms introduce new products and “better” marketing techniques.
50Singapore requires that hotels price their international phone calls at marginal cost, plus a maximum of 30
Singaporean cents (which is about 20 U.S. cents).
25Appendix 1: The Demand Function D(x)
We deﬁne D(x) as the demand of a ﬁrm that oﬀers an average perceived surplus x units greater
than the average perceived surplus provided by its competitors. We develop the microfoundations
for D(x) using random utility theory (see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992] for an excel-
lent review). We assume that good i gives agent a decision utility equal to Uai = vi − pi + εai,
where εai is i.i.d. across ﬁrms i and agents a, with cumulative distribution function F and
density f = F0. We interpret εia as a tremble or an idiosyncratic consumer preference [Mc-
Fadden 1981]. We normalize the mass of consumers to 1. The demand for ﬁrm i is thus:
Di = P (vi − pi + εai ≥ maxj6=i vj − pj + εaj). We will be looking for symmetric equilibria where a
ﬁrm posts quality v and prices p, while the other ﬁrms post the same quality v∗ and price p∗,a n d
all ﬁrms have the same σ. In those cases, one can set S = v − p and S∗ = v∗ − p∗, introducing
short-hand for the net average surpluses. Then the demand for ﬁrm 1 is D1 = D(S − S∗),w h e r e
we deﬁne
(16) D(x) ≡ P
µ







f (ε)Fn−1 (x + ε)dε.
See Perloﬀ and Salop [1985] or Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992]. The demand depends only
on the diﬀerence S − S∗ between the surplus S oﬀered by the ﬁrms, and the surplus S∗ oﬀered by
its competitors. The following Proposition characterizes the symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Suppose that lnf is concave, and that ﬁrms compete in prices, and have identical costs
c and values v, so that the proﬁto faﬁrm charging p is (p − c)D(p∗ − p). Then there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium with p − c = µ := D(0)/D0 (0).A l s o ,
(17) µD(0) = max
x xD(−x + µ).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1. The existence of the symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed by Caplin and
Nalebuﬀ [1991], Theorem 2 and Proposition 7. If marginal costs are c and proﬁts are (p − c)D(p∗ − p),
the ﬁrst order condition is D(p∗ − p)−(p − c)D0 (p∗ − p)=0 . In the symmetric equilibrium, p = p∗
and so p − c = µ. Finally, equation 17 just reﬂects that a price p = p∗ = µ is an equilibrium if
c =0 .
26A few cases have compact closed forms. If the noise is Gumbel distributed, i.e. F (ε)=
exp(−e−ε), the demand is logistic: D(x)=1 /[1 + (n − 1)e−x]. If the noise is exponentially
distributed with density e−ε1ε>0, the demand is D(x)=ex £
1 − 1x≥0 (1 − e−x)
n¤
/n. If the noise is
uniformly distributed in [−1/2,1/2],t h e nD(x)=0for x<−1, D(x)=( 1+x)
n /n for x ∈ [−1,0],
D(x)=x +( 1− xn)/n if x ∈ [0,1],a n dD(x)=1for x>1.
Appendix 2: Longer Derivations
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The timeline is detailed in section II. We specify the sequential
equilibrium of the game. We use the terminology from Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, pp.337-341].
We call p∗and b p∗ the equilibrium prices at other ﬁrms for the base good and the add-on respectively,
and we call p and b p the prices at ﬁrm i.W ec a l le b p and e b p∗ the beliefs of the sophisticated consumers
about add-on prices. We need to check sequential rationality and consistency of the beliefs and
actions. If a ﬁrm unshrouds b p, then the sophisticated consumers know b p, which pins down their
belief. If a ﬁrm shrouds b p, then sophisticated consumers rationally believe that the ﬁrm will charge
the monopoly price in period 2: e b p = p, as this is the proﬁt maximizing price for the ﬁrm that shrouds.
Given the belief e b p = p, the sequentially rational action for the sophisticated consumers is to exert
the eﬀort e. Hence sequential equilibrium very simply characterizes the beliefs of sophisticated
consumers and the newly educated myopes, who behave exactly like sophisticated consumers. The
beliefs of the myopes do not matter, as they just pick with equal probability a ﬁrm amongst the
ﬁrms who charge the lowest base good prices.
We now check that ﬁrm i does not want to deviate from the announced strategies.
Case 1: α<α † and the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium.
• Firm i can shroud and pick p and b p.I t sp r o ﬁti se q u a lt o
π =
¡
p +( 1− α) b p1b p≤p
¢
D(p∗ − p),
as the beliefs are e b p = e b p∗ = p and the demand for the base good of all the consumers depends
only on p∗ − p.T h i sp r o ﬁt is clearly maximized when b p = p so that
π =( p +( 1− α)p)D(p∗ − p).
27T h eb a s eg o o dp r i c ep that solves the ﬁrst order condition −(p +( 1− α)p)D0(p∗−p)+D(p∗−
p)=0for p = p∗ is p = p∗ = −(1 − α)p + µ.
• Firm i can unshroud and pick p and b p. By unshrouding its add-on price, ﬁrm i educates
some of the myopes and the fraction of sophisticates becomes α0 = α+λ(1−α).T h em y o p e s
keep ignoring the price of the add-on when deciding to buy the add-on while the sophisticates
incorporate it and will buy it iﬀ b p ≤ e.
— If b p ≤ e
π = α0 (p + b p)D(−p − b p + p∗ + e)+( 1− α0)(p + b p)D(p∗ − p),
which is maximized when b p = e. Otherwise ﬁrm i can increase b p by a small positive
increment, decrease p by the same increment, and not change the demand of sophisticated
consumers while increasing strictly the demand of naive consumers. Hence, the proﬁt
can be reexpressed:
π =( p + e)D(p∗ − p).
As α<α †,t h i sp r o ﬁti ss m a l l e rt h a n(p +( 1− α)p)D(p∗ − p), the proﬁt ﬁrm i could
achieve by choosing to shroud and price at p and b p = p.
— If b p>e ,
π =
¡
p +( 1− α0)b p1b p≤p
¢
D(p∗ − p),
which is strictly smaller than (p +( 1− α)p)D(p∗−p), the proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by
choosing to shroud and price at p and b p = p.
— We conclude that the best response of ﬁrm i is to shroud and price at p = p∗ =
−(1 − α)p + µ and b p = b p∗ = p.
Case 2: α† <αand the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium.
• Firm i can unshroud and pick p and b p.
— If b p ≤ e,
π = α0 (p + b p)D(−p − b p + p∗ + e)+( 1− α0)(p + b p)D(p∗ − p),
which is maximized when b p = e.O t h e r w i s e ﬁrm i can increase b p by a small posi-
tive increment, decrease p by the same increment, and not change the demand of so-
28phisticated consumers while increasing strictly the demand of naive consumers. Hence
π =( p + e)D(p∗ − p). In equilibrium, the base good price p solves the ﬁrst order
condition, −(p + e)D0(p∗ − p)+D(p∗ − p)=0 . This implies that p = p∗ = −e + µ.
— If b p>e , only myopes buy the add-on, and
π =
¡
p +( 1− α0)b p1b p≤p
¢
D(p∗ − p).
This proﬁt is clearly maximized when b p = p.T h ep r o ﬁti sπ =( p +( 1− α0)p)D(p∗−p),
which is strictly smaller than (p + e)D(p∗−p), the proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by choosing
to unshroud and price at p and b p = e.
• Firm i can shroud and pick p and b p and get a proﬁte q u a lt o
π =
¡
p +( 1− α0) b p1b p≤p
¢
D(p∗ − p),
as the beliefs are e b p = p. One needs α0 rather than α in the above expression, because the other
ﬁrms unshroud, so they educate a fraction λ of the myopes. This proﬁt is clearly maximized
when b p = p. The proﬁti sπ =( p +( 1− α0)p)D(p∗ − p), which is also strictly smaller than
the proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by choosing to unshroud and price at p and b p = e.
• We conclude that the best response of ﬁrm i is to unshroud and price at p = p∗ = −e + µ
and b p = b p∗ = e.
Proof of Proposition 3. We follow closely the proof of Proposition 1. The ﬁrm’s optimal value
b p must still be either e or p.R e c a l l t h a t α0 = α + λ(1 − α) represents the fraction of informed
consumers after unshrouding. If the ﬁrm unshrouds, its proﬁt depends on whether b p = e or b p = p:












D(p∗ − p), (18)








D(p∗ − p). (19)
If it does not unshroud, its proﬁti s
(20) Π =m a x
p (p +( 1− α)TMMp)D(p∗ − p).







e ≤ max(TS,T MM + TMS)e
< (1 − α)pTMM
as α<α ††.T h i si m p l i e sΠ(b p = e) < Π. Unshrouding and posting a low price e for the add-on is
not proﬁtable. Also, Π(b p = p) < Π by equation 19, 20 and α0 >α . Unshrouding and posting a
high price p for the add-on is also not proﬁtable.
We conclude that whatever price the ﬁrm chooses to charge for the add-on, unshrouding is not
proﬁtable.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .We deﬁne the average demand in the add-on market
(21) b q(b p) ≡ αb qS (b p)+( 1− α) b qM (b p),
In this proof, we call p∗and b p∗ = b pm the equilibrium prices described in the Proposition. We check
that the shrouded prices in the Proposition constitute an equilibrium.
First, it is clear that if a ﬁrm shrouds, the add-on price is the monopoly price b pm.W ec h e c k
that the optimal base good price is the one announced in equation 10. Without loss of generality,
we take c =0to simplify exposition.51 The proﬁts are
Π =
³
p +(b pm − b c)b q(b pm)
´
D(−p + p∗).
If p is an equilibrium, ∂Π/∂p =0at p = p∗.T h i si m p l i e sp +(b pm − b c)b q(b pm)=D(0)/D0 (0) = µ,
which is equation 10.
We now calculate the proﬁto faﬁrm that deviates, unshrouds, and sets new prices p and b p,
while the other ﬁrms keep shrouding and using the prices p∗and b p∗ given in equations 10-11. A
sophisticate facing price b p in the aftermarket gets the net utility
(22) b v(b p)=m a x
b q,b e
b u(b e, b q) − b pb q.
Call b q(b p) (or b qS (b p) if there is an ambiguity) the associated choice of add-on demand, and b u(b p)=
b v(b p)+b pb q(b p) the gross utility. The utility provided by the other ﬁrms is: uS∗ = −p∗ + b v(b p∗).
51To go back to the general case, replace p by p − c.
30The ﬁrm’s proﬁti s
Π =( p +(b p − b c) b q(b p))D
¡
−p + b v(b p) − uS∗¢
= xD
¡
−x +(b p − b c) b q(b p)+b v(b p) − uS∗¢
,
where x = p +(b p − b c) b q(b p) is the total proﬁt per customer. Maximizing Π(x, b p) over b p and noting
that (22) and the envelope theorem imply ∂




[(b p − b c) b q(b p)+b v(b p)] = b q(b p) − b q(b p)+(b p − b c) b q0 (b p)=( b p − b c) b q0 (b p).
This implies b p − b c =0 .W h e n a ﬁrm faces only sophisticated consumers, it prices of the add-on
eﬃciently. So the highest proﬁtt h eﬁrm can get after deviating is
(23) Π =m a x
x xD(−x + x∗),
with x∗ = b v(b c) − uS∗.
As the pre-deviation proﬁti sµ,t h eﬁrm does not want to deviate iﬀ
(24) Π ≤ µD(0),
as µD(0) is the pre-deviation proﬁt. Given equation 17, equation 23, and the fact that maxx xD(−x + z)
is non-decreasing in z,( 2 4 )i se q u i v a l e n tt ox∗ ≤ µ.T oﬁnd the sign of x∗ − µ,w ec a l c u l a t e
x∗ − µ = b v(b c) − uS∗ − µ = b v(b c) − b v(b p∗)+p∗ − µ
= b v(b c) − b uS (b p∗)+b p∗b qS (b p∗) − (b p∗ − b c)b q(b p∗) by (10) and (22)
= b v(b c) − b uS (b p∗)+b p∗b qS (b p∗) − (b p∗ − b c)
£
αb qS (b p∗)+( 1− α) b qM (b p∗)
¤
by (21)
= b u(b c) − b cb qS (b c) − b uS (b p∗)+b cb qS (b p∗) − (1 − α)(b p∗ − b c)
¡
b qM (b p∗) − b qS (b p∗)
¢
by (22).
As the ﬁrm does not want to deviate iﬀ x∗ − µ ≤ 0, the Proposition is proven.
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